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The  Credit  Crunch 
ACCORDING  TO many popular  accounts, the severity of the recession 
that  began  in July 1990  was worsened  by financial  distress-or,  at least, 
by financial  discomfort-in  a number  of sectors of the economy. Much 
of this discussion  centered  on the so-called  "credit  crunch"  in the bank- 
ing  sector.  ' As early  as the spring  of 1990,  some months  before  the reces- 
sion began, there were newspaper  reports  (mostly anecdotal)  of banks 
cutting  back on lending,  sometimes  with deleterious  effects on retailers 
and  other  bank  borrowers.  In June  the secretary  of commerce  called  the 
credit  crunch  a serious problem,2  and congressional  hearings  on the is- 
sue were held during  the summer.  As the recession arrived  in July and 
then deepened  during  the fall, the view that a credit  crunch  was playing 
at least some role in the downturn  became increasingly  widespread 
among  policymakers,  including  some at the Federal  Reserve. 
Despite these developments,  there  was, and still is, a notable  lack of 
consensus  about  the importance  of a credit  crunch  in the banking  sector, 
its causes, and even the meaning  of the term. Although  it is too early to 
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1. Some commentators  have raised  the possibility  of a generalized  credit  crunch  af- 
fecting  all credit  sources, not  just banking.  We briefly  discuss this possibility  below, but 
our  paper  focuses on the banking  sector. 
2. See Alan  Murray,  "Mosbacher  Says 'Serious'  Credit  Crunch  Grips  U.S., Isn't Lim- 
ited to Real  Estate,"  Wall  Street  Journal,  June 15, 1990,  p. A3. 
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attempt  a definitive  evaluation  of the credit  crunch  (as of the fall of 1991, 
it is still not certain  whether  the recession has ended), we try in this pa- 
per  to shed some light  on these issues. We begin  by reviewing  the recent 
behavior  of bank  lending, finding  that lending  has been weak recently, 
even relative  to previous  recessionary  periods.  This weakness has been 
most pronounced  in the northeastern  part  of the country, though  it has 
not been confined  to that  region. 
Next we consider  why the lending  slowdown  has occurred.  It seems 
probable  that demand  factors, including  the weakened state of borrow- 
ers' balance sheets, caused much of the slowdown. However, we also 
argue  that  a shortage  of equity capital  has limited  banks'  ability  to make 
loans, particularly  in the most affected regions. Thus we agree with 
Richard  Syron, president  of the Boston Federal  Reserve, that  the credit 
crunch  might  better  be called a "capital  crunch."  3 We present  evidence 
for the capital  crunch  hypothesis  using  both state-level  data  and  data  on 
individual  banks. 
The most difficult  issue is whether  the slowdown  in bank  lending  has 
had a significant  macroeconomic  effect. Although  it is likely that  a bank 
credit  crunch  (or capital  crunch)  has occurred  and  has imposed  costs on 
some borrowers, we are somewhat skeptical that the credit crunch 
played a major  role in worsening  the 1990  recession. There are several 
reasons  that  we take  this view. First, our  estimates  of the effect of falling 
bank  capital  on lending  are statistically  significant  but small, suggesting 
that  in most regions  the capital  shortage  has had  only a modest  effect on 
the availability  of loans. Second, we find  little  relationship  between  bank 
capital-asset  ratios and employment  growth across states. Finally, it 
appears  that all types of credit extension, not just bank lending, have 
slowed since the onset of the recession; this suggests that  falling  credit 
demand  is a major  factor  in the lending  slowdown. 
In the last part of this report  we also discuss the implications  of the 
credit crunch  for policy, particularly  for banking  reform  and monetary 
policy. We argue  that a credit  crunch  does not seriously  affect the Fed- 
eral Reserve's capacity to stabilize the economy but that it may make 
indicators  of monetary  policy more  difficult  to read. 
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Recent Developments  in Bank Lending 
We define a bank credit crunch  as a significant  leftward  shift in the 
supply  curve  for bank  loans, holding  constant  both the safe real interest 
rate and the quality  of potential  borrowers.'  In order  to get at the ques- 
tion of whether  there has been a credit  crunch,  we begin in this section 
by documenting  the behavior  of bank lending  during  the recent reces- 
sion and  by comparing  this  behavior  to previous  recessionary  episodes.5 
In later sections we consider alternative  explanations  for the behavior 
of bank  lending. 
The basic data on bank lending during  recessions are presented in 
table 1, which compares  the growth rates of nominal  loans and leases 
outstanding  during  the 1990  recession with  their  growth  rates  in five ear- 
lier  recessions. Each  entry  in the table  shows the annualized  growth  rate 
of a category  of loans over the first  three quarters  of a particular  reces- 
sion. For example, the recent recession began in the third quarter  of 
1990  (1990:3);  thus the table shows the growth  rates  of the various  cate- 
gories of loans between 1990:2  and 1991:1.  (We choose to look at devel- 
opments  over three quarters  because 1991:1  is the most recent quarter 
for which we have data on the current recession.) We measure loan 
changes beginning  at the peak because most studies have found bank 
lending  to be approximately  coincident  with the cycle,6 although  begin- 
ning our measurements  two or four quarters  before the cyclical peak 
would not significantly  affect our conclusions. The table presents data 
for the major  domestic  financial  intermediaries  as a group  (domestically 
chartered  commercial  banks, savings  and  loans institutions,  mutual  sav- 
4.  As we discuss in the latter  part  of this report,  we see no necessary  connection  be- 
tween  a credit  crunch  and  credit  rationing  in a strict  sense. 
5. Throughout,  we use only loans outstanding,  and exclude securities held, when 
measuring  credit  extension  by banks.  This choice is based  on the conventional  presump- 
tion that bank  loans are "special,"  in the sense of being imperfect  substitutes  for other 
forms  of credit, but that banks  are in no way special  in their  ability  to hold open-market 
securities.  Measuring  bank  credit  as the sum  of loans  and  securities,  as a few authors  have, 
seems to us to miss the point. 
6. An exception  is the 1973-75  recession, in which  the decline  in loan growth  signifi- 
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Table 1. The Growth  of Lending  over Six Recessions,  by Year  of Cyclical  Peak 
Percent 
Type  of loan  1960  1969  1973  1980  1981  1990 
All  financial intermediaries 
Total loans  7.5  4.4  12.2  3.5  5.4  -3.6 
Commercial-industrial  loans  3.6  10.1  19.2  4.8  17.0  -2.4 
Real estate loans  8.9  4.0  10.4  4.9  2.6  -3.7 
1-4-family  8.6  3.3  9.9  5.7  1.6  -  2.3 
Other  10.6  5.8  11.9  2.5  5.6  -7.1 
Consumer  and other loans  7.6  0.2  10.0  -1.0  2.3  -4.3 
Domestically  chartered  commercial  banks 
Total loans  4.4  4.1  14.6  3.1  9.3  1.7 
Commercial-industrial  loans  3.6  10.1  19.2  4.8  16.8  -  1.1 
Real estate loans  1.6  2.9  15.4  5.8  7.7  5.9 
1-4-family  -0.9  2.0  15.0  6.4  5.9  10.5 
Other  6.9  4.2  16.0  4.8  10.7  0.1 
Consumer and other loans  6.8  -  1.3  9.7  -1.0  2.6  -  1.7 
Macroeconomic  conditions 
Nonagricultural  employment 
growth  -1.3  0.6  2.4  -0.9  -1.3  -1.3 
Inflation  1.8  4.9  10.3  11.0  7.2  5.8 
Source:  Nominal  loan  data  are  from  the  Flow  of  Funds  and  have  been  seasonally  adjusted  by  Xl I .  All 
financial intermediaries  include all commercial  banks,  savings  and loans,  mutual savings  banks,  and credit unions. 
Nonagricultural employment growth and inflation (measured by the CPI-X, which excludes  the inappropriate influence 
of  mortgage  interest  rates  that exists  in  the  standard CPI)  are  from  the  Federal  Reserve  Board and  have  been 
seasonally  adjusted.  Percentage  growth rates are annualized  and measured from the quarter preceding the cyclical 
peak until three quarters later. 
ings banks, and credit  unions)  and for domestically  chartered  commer- 
cial banks  as a separate  group.  To put the loan growth  data  in its macro- 
economic context, table 1 also reports  annualized  employment  growth 
and inflation  rates over the corresponding  time periods.7 
Table 1  indicates  that  lending  activity  by banks  and  other  financial  in- 
stitutions  was weak during  the 1990-91  period,  weaker  even than  in the 
other  recessions. Indeed,  loans outstanding  actually  declined  during  this 
recession. In part, the decline in lending  reflects  the ongoing  shrinkage 
of the savings and loan industry  (S&L loans outstanding  fell by more 
than  20 percent  between 1989:2  and 1991:1).  But, as table 1 shows, lend- 
ing  by domestically  chartered  commercial  banks  was also far  from  vigor- 
ous, as total bank  loans grew only 1.7 percent  (at an annual  rate)  during 
7. By the employment  metric, 1990  looks like a particularly  bad  recession. However, 
it should  be noted  that  declines  in employment  occurred  earlier  in this  recession  than  nor- 
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the first  three  quarters  of the 1990  recession, and  loans outstanding  other 
than  for real  estate actually  fell in nominal  terms. For banks, only mort- 
gage  loans  for 1-4-family  residences  showed significant  growth  after  the 
1990  peak, probably  reflecting  both acquisitions  from  thrifts  and  the rel- 
atively favorable  treatment  of these loans under  the new risk-weighted 
capital  standards. 
Table 1  follows the conventional  practice  of measuring  loans in nomi- 
nal terms. An alternative-and most economists' first instinct-would 
be to measure  changes  in loans outstanding  in real  terms. Since inflation 
during  the 1990  recession was lower than in the three previous reces- 
sions (see table 1), measuring  growth  rates  of lending  in real  terms  would 
reduce the contrast  between lending  growth  in 1990  and that in earlier 
recessions. Notice, for example, that in real terms bank  lending  in the 
1980 recession contracted  by considerably  more than in the 1990 ep- 
isode. 
Estimating  loan growth  in real  terms,  however, can also mislead.  The 
problem is exemplified  by the early stages of the Great Depression, 
when rapidly  falling  prices led to an increase in the real value of loans 
outstanding.  Yet the 1930s  were hardly  a period  of easy credit. Ideally 
what  we would  like to measure  is the real  value  of new credit  extensions, 
which is well approximated  by the change  in the real value of loans out- 
standing  only if the effective maturity  of bank  loans is very short.8  If the 
effective maturity  of loans (by which we mean the maturity  implied  by 
the ongoing  relationship  of borrower  and  lender  rather  than  the contrac- 
tually  stated  maturity)  is very long, then the real value of new credit  ex- 
tensions is actually  better approximated  by the nominal  growth  rate of 
loans outstanding.9  We will continue  to use nominal  growth  rates when 
measuring  loans and  other  balance  sheet items, but readers  may use the 
inflation  rates in table 1 to make  their  own adjustments. 
A different  breakdown  of the recent slowdown in lending, this time 
by geographic  region, is presented in table 2. As most accounts of the 
8. The change  in the real  value  of loans  outstanding  is the sum  of the real  value  of new 
credit  extensions  and  the change  in the real  value  of preexisting  loans. The second  term  is 
zero only if loans  have  instantaneous  maturity. 
9. If nominal  loans have infinite  maturity,  the real value  of credit  extensions  is ALIP, 
where  L is nominal  loans  and  P is the price  level. Real  credit  extensions  relative  to the real 
value  of existing  loans  equals  (ALIP)I(LIP),  which  is the same  as ALIL,  the  growth  in nomi- 
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Table 2.  The Growth of Commercial Bank Lending by Region,  1990:2-1991:1 
Percent 
Real  estate 
Commer-cial  Percent 
Total  and  1-4  Consumer  of all 
Census region  loans  industrial  Total  family  Other  and other  loans 
New England  -  13.6  -  18.4  -7.6  -5.4  - 11.1  - 20.6  6.2 
Mid-Atlantic  -2.1  -4.8  3.9  12.7  -3.4  -5.9  22.9 
East North Central  1.8  -0.3  7.4  9.5  5.1  -3.2  15.9 
West North Central  4.7  -  1.2  9.1  13.6  4.8  4.5  6.6 
South  Atlantic  1.2  - 5.8  4.8  10.8  -0.3  0.9  18.7 
East South Central  1.5  -1.1  4.6  8.2  0.8  -0.7  4.6 
West South  Central  -0.2  -1.8  -0.8  6.0  -6.2  2.5  6.3 
Mountain  2.6  -10.7  1.8  9.3  -4.3  10.4  3.8 
Pacific  6.8  4.3  12.7  15.9  10.3  - 2.4  14.9 
Source:  Data are for nominal loans and leases,  net of unearned income, and are taken from the call reports. Growth 
rates  have  been  annualized.  Because  of  the cost  of  extracting  long time  series  from the call  reports,  data are not 
seasonally  adjusted. 
credit  situation  have stressed, there  is indeed  a strong  regional  aspect to 
the contraction  of bank  credit. New England,  in particular,  has experi- 
enced a sharp  fall in bank loans outstanding,  continuing  a trend  begun 
before  the onset of the recession. The slowdown  has not been restricted 
to New England,  however:  total nominal  loans declined  in the Mid-At- 
lantic and West South Central  regions as well, and commercial  and in- 
dustrial  (C&I)  loans fell in every region except the Pacific  region. For 
comparison,  note from  table 1 that  aggregate  nominal  C&I  loans did not 
decline in any of the five earlier  recessions. 
Although  we have emphasized  changes in the quantity  of loans out- 
standing,  it would  also be interesting  to know what has happened  to the 
price  of loans, as reflected  in loan interest  rates  and  credit  terms. Unfor- 
tunately,  there  are  at least two serious  practical  difficulties  in measuring 
the true  cost of a bank  loan  to the borrower.  First,  the cost of a bank  loan 
is multidimensional,  involving,  for example, collateral  and compensat- 
ing balance  requirements  as well as a contractual  interest  rate. Second, 
it is difficult  to control  for systematic  changes in the quality  of the bor- 
rower receiving  the loan. Thus reported  measures  of the cost of credit 
should  be interpreted  cautiously. 
However, for the record, the behavior  of credit terms in this reces- 
sion has been similar  to that in previous  recessions. Nominal  loan rates 
fell slightly  over the first  two quarters  of the recession before dropping 
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has happened  in previous downturns.  10  For example, a survey by the 
National  Federation  of Independent  Business reports  that  interest  rates 
paid by small businesses on short-term  loans were 12.0 percent in 
1990:1,  11.9 percent  in 1990:2-1990:4,  and 11.2  percent  in 1991:1."1  Ac- 
cording to the Federal Reserve's Survey on the Terms of Business 
Lending,  the effective rate  on short-term  C&I  loans was 9.93 percent  in 
1990:1,  9.77 percent  in 1990:4,  and  8.43 percent  in 1991:1.  The  prime  rate 
was stable at 10.0 percent  during  most of 1990  but fell to 9.0 percent  in 
March  1991.12  With  respect to credit  terms other than the interest  rate, 
the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank 
Lending  Practices reports  a tightening  of credit standards  during  1990 
that  appears  about  normal  for a recessionary  period.'3 
Why Has Bank Lending Slowed? 
Tables 1 and  2 are consistent  with the popular  view that  bank  lending 
has been weak, even for a recession, and that the sharpest  contractions 
have taken  place in the northeastern  part  of the country.  Slow growth  in 
lending  could be the result of weak demand  for credit, weak supply, or 
both. In this section  we first  briefly  discuss credit  demand,  then  consider 
some potential  factors operating  on the supply side (that is, within the 
banking  sector itself). 
Credit Demand  and Borrowers' Balance  Sheets 
It is normal  for the demand  for credit to fall during  a recession, re- 
flecting  declines  in demand  for new construction,  producers'  investment 
goods, and consumer  durables.  According  to table 1, however, lending 
during  the recent recession has been unusually  weak. Thus a demand- 
10. The prime  rate  has fallen  in each of the past six recessions  except 1973.  The C&I 
loan  rate,  as reported  by the Survey  on the  Terms  of Business  Lending,  fell by 4.25  percent 
over the first  three  quarters  of the 1980  recession  and  by 2.86 percent  over the first  three 
quarters  of the 1981  recession,  compared  with  a decline  of 1.54  percent  over the first  three 
quarters  of the latest  recession  (earlier  data  are  not available). 
11. National  Federation  of Independent  Business  (1991,  p. 13). 
12. Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1991,  table 1.33. 
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side explanation  of the fall in lending  must say why credit demand  has 
behaved  differently  in this recession. 
A possible answer  focuses on the generally  weak state of borrowers' 
balance sheets. As documented elsewhere, many borrowers signifi- 
cantly increased their leverage during  the past decade,14 while falling 
prices for real estate and other assets have adversely  affected  potential 
borrowers'  net worth. Further,  the recession has put additional  pres- 
sures on cash flows.'5 For a given set of ultimate  investment  opportuni- 
ties, borrowers who are less creditworthy  (such as those who have 
higher  leverage or lower collateral)  will have a lower effective demand 
for external  finance  at given values of the safe real interest  rate. Thus, it 
may be that in the recent downturn  the normal  recessionary  decline in 
credit  demand  has been exacerbated  by a greater-than-normal  decline  in 
the creditworthiness  of potential  borrowers. 
Some support  for the view that demand  factors have been important 
comes from  the fact that  nonbank  credit  extensions also weakened  sub- 
stantially  in the 1990  recession, a point  we return  to later  in the paper.  If 
a reduced supply of bank loans had caused the lending slowdown, we 
would have expected alternative  forms of credit to grow more quickly 
as borrowers  substitute  away from  banks. 
For some questions,  such  as whether  to regulate  and  reform  the bank- 
ing system, it is important  to know whether the unusual  slowdown in 
bank lending  arises from problems  with borrower  creditworthiness  or 
from  problems  in the banking  system. However, as we discuss later,  for 
purposes of macroeconomic stabilization the distinction is less  im- 
portant,  as the effects on the macroeconomy  are similar  in either  case. 
We now turn  to consider  a number  of factors  operating  on the supply 
side of the loan market,  including  the availability  of loanable  funds, se- 
curitization  of bank  assets, the zeal of bank  examiners,  and  the possible 
shortage  of bank  equity capital. Although  each factor may have played 
a role, we argue  that a shortage  of equity capital  is the most important 
factor  reducing  loan supply. 
14. Bernanke,  Campbell,  and  Whited  (1990)  discuss  the case of corporate  borrowers. 
15. According  to Department  of Commerce  data  cited by Rodrigues  (1991),  the ratio 
of interest  payments  to before-tax  cash flow for nonfinancial  corporations  was nearly  23 
percent  at the end of 1990,  the highest  value of the decade. This ratio was less than 18 
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Availability of Loanable  Funds 
In order  to lend, banks  must  have funds:  the bank's  capital,  its check- 
ing and saving  deposits, or its managed  liabilities,  like large  certificates 
of deposit (CDs). According  to the so-called credit view of monetary 
policy, which  has had some revival  in recent  years, one channel  through 
which changes in bank reserves (induced  by open market  operations) 
can affect real activity is by affecting  the quantity  of funds that banks 
have to lend.  16 In the days when  all bank  liabilities  faced reserve  require- 
ments, the ability  of the Federal  Reserve to affect the quantity  of funds 
available  to banks  was limited  only by the ability  of the banking  system 
to shift  from  high-reserve  ratio  to low-reserve ratio  liabilities.  Now that 
managed  liabilities are exempt from reserve requirements,  the credit 
view requires  the stronger  hypothesis that banks face an imperfectly 
elastic market  demand  for their  managed  liabilities,  or alternatively  that 
banks are unwilling  to finance marginal  loans entirely from managed 
liabilities.  17 
Many observers argue  that tight monetary  policy contributed  to the 
onset of the 1990  recession, and some have also argued  that monetary 
policy has not sufficiently  eased since the recession began. Could a 
shortage  of loanable  funds, induced  by tight  monetary  policy, be the rea- 
son that  bank  lending  has slowed?  An observation  that  counters  this sug- 
gestion is that  banks  do not appear  to have been very aggressive  in seek- 
ing funds. For example, according to Flow of Funds data from the 
Federal  Reserve, the ratio of large  time deposits to total bank  deposits 
in domestically  chartered  commercial  banks  fell from  0.192 in 1989:2,  to 
0.184 in 1990:2,  to 0.164 in 1991:1.  By contrast,  during  the 1973-75  and 
1981-82  recessions, during  which  tight  monetary  policy arguably  played 
an important  role, this ratio  jumped  sharply.18  The interest  rates  on CDs 
16. See Bernanke  and Blinder  (forthcoming)  and Kashyap,  Stein, and Wilcox (1991) 
for discussions of and evidence supporting  the credit view. Romer and Romer (1990) 
present  opposing  evidence. 
17. Banks may not wish to finance  new loans entirely  out of managed  liabilities  be- 
cause requiring  borrowers  to hold deposit  balances  with the bank  may reduce  the bank's 
monitoring  costs. 
18. An alternative  explanation  for the fall in large  time deposits, suggested  to us by 
Ron  Johnson,  is that  large  brokered  time  deposits  are  now more  likely  to be broken  up  into 214  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1991 
have also come down, even more so than  other  interest  rates  have. Sec- 
ondary-market  rates for six-month  CDs exceeded six-month  Treasury 
bill rates by 100  basis points or more in 1988  and 1989,  but by only 71 
basis points, on average, in 1990.  As of April 1991,  the differential  was 
down to 45 basis points.  19  Banks' reluctance  to bid  for funds-which  in- 
dicates that a shortage  of funds is not the constraining  factor-has  con- 
tributed  to the slowdown in M2 growth over the past year, although  a 
greater  role in the slowdown  has been played  by the decline in thrift  de- 
posits. Overall,  evidence is lacking  for the view that  a shortage  of funds 
is a principal  cause of the lending  slowdown. 
Securitization  of Bank Loans 
A second supply-side  factor  that  may help explain  the apparent  slow- 
down in bank lending  is the upward  trend in the securitization  of bank 
loans. Banks  now regularly  initiate  loans with the intention  of selling  off 
all or part  of their  holdings  to other  investors. Loans  that  are securitized 
in this manner  do not appear  on banks' balance sheets and thus would 
not be counted  in standard  measures  of bank  loans (as in tables 1  and  2). 
Conceivably,  the apparent  slowdown  in bank  lending  could  be a mirage, 
the result  of an innovation  in the way that  banks  finance  their  lending. 
In general, banks securitize three types of assets: consumer credit 
(like  auto  loans  and  credit  card  receivables),  mortgages,  and  commercial 
and industrial  loans. Although  data on bank originations  in each cate- 
gory are scanty, a few words can be said about  each type of securitized 
asset. 
First, securitized consumer credit remains a fairly small category, 
though  it is growing  rapidly.  In March  1991,  total  outstandings  of securi- 
tized consumer  credit, including  all originators,  were nearly  $82  billion, 
up from nearly $66 billion in the peak month  of the cycle, July 1990.20 
By comparison,  outstanding  on-balance-sheet  bank loans are about $2 
trillion  and  bank  consumer  loans are approaching  $400  billion.  If all sec- 
uritized  consumer  credit were attributed  to banks (an overstatement), 
smaller  deposits to gain the benefit  of deposit insurance.  It is true that the ratio  of total 
time deposits  (large  plus small)  to total  deposits  in commercial  banks  has been essentially 
constant  over the recent  period. 
19. Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1991,  table 1.35. 
20.  Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1991,  table 1.55. Ben S. Bernanke and Cara S. Lown  215 
the "consumer  and  other"  category  of bank  loans in table 1 would show 
an annualized  growth rate of about 1.3 percent between 1990:2  and 
1991:1,  rather  than  a decline of 1.7 percent. This difference  is not insig- 
nificant,  but it does not change  the overall  impression  of slow growth  in 
bank  lending. 
In contrast  to securitized  consumer  credit, the value of outstanding 
securitized  mortgages  is very large  (and  growing  rapidly).  According  to 
the Flow of Funds accounts, outstanding  "pools"  of securitized  mort- 
gages  exceeded $1  trillion  in 1990,  an amount  that  exceeds bank  holdings 
of mortgages  and that is more than a quarter  of the entire mortgage 
market.  These pools predominantly  comprise government-guaranteed 
mortgages  for 1-4-family residences. We do not know what portion  of 
these mortgage  pools were initiated by banks. However, as table 1 
shows, bank  holdings  of 1-4-family mortgages  grew more quickly  than 
all other  loan holdings  during  the recent  recession, so there  is little indi- 
cation of restricted  bank lending  in the residential  mortgage  market  in 
any case. 
We should  care about  bank  lending  per se, as opposed to total credit 
extension, only if banks  are somehow special in their  ability  to evaluate 
and monitor  borrowers.  The case for banks' specialness is difficult  to 
make for consumer  installment  credit or residential  mortgage  lending, 
which are relatively standardized  activities. By contrast, C&I lending 
epitomizes what theory would identify as a special function of banks. 
Thus, the degree to which banks are able to securitize C&I  loans is of 
particular  interest. 
The  available  data  on bank  sales of C&I  loans  are summarized  in table 
3. The data  are  nominal,  in billions  of dollars,  and  only selected quarters 
are shown for the pre-1988  period. The data on loans bought  and sold, 
developed by Gary Gorton  and George Pennacchi  and updated  by us 
from  the call  reports,  are  flow  measures  of activity  in  the  loan  sales  market: 
the first column gives the volume of loan sales reported  by domestic 
commercial  banks for the previous quarter  (the figures  are not  annu- 
alized),  and  the second column  gives reported  loan  purchases  by domes- 
tic banks.  The third  column  in the table measures  the stock of outstand- 
ing loans sold, as obtained from the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan 
Officer  Survey. Unlike the call reports, the survey does not cover all 
banks; those administering  the surveys estimated that its coverage of 
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Table  3. Commercial  Bank  Loan  Sales, Loan  Purchases,  and Loans  Outstanding, 
Selected  Quarters,  1983-91 
Billions of dollars 
Sold or 
participated 
Loans  Loans  loans 
Quarter  sold  purchased  outstanding 
1983:4  29.1  ...  ... 
1984:4  50.2  ...  ... 
1985:4  75.7  . . .  26.1 
1986:4  111.8  ... 
1987:1  162.9  . . .  38.7 
1987:4  198.0  ...  ... 
1988:1  236.3  16.6  ... 
1988:2  248.4  16.2  53.1 
1988:3  263.0  17.7  ... 
1988:4  286.8  19.3 
1989:1  272.7  16.2  ... 
1989:2  276.5  18.2  72.2 
1989:3  290.9  17.8  ... 
1989:4  258.7  19.9  ... 
1990:1  228.3  16.1  ... 
1990:2  190.2  15.9  80.0 
1990:3  216.6  16.1  ... 
1990:4  165.0  17.1  ... 
1991:1  132.9  13.0  ... 
1991:2  ...  ...  59.5 
Source:  Sales and purchases data are from Gorton and Pennacchi (1991), with updates after 1990:3 by the authors, 
using the call reports. Loans  sales and purchase data are quarterly flows.  Sales  reported are gross and exclude  sales 
of  mortgage loans,  consumer  loans,  or loans  subject to repurchase  agreements  or with recourse  to seller.  Data on 
outstandings  are from the Federal Reserve's  Senior Loan  Officer Opinion Survey  on  Bank Lending Practices.  The 
survey's  estimated  coverage  of sold loans outstanding is 70 percent in 1985:4 and 90 percent in 1989:2. 
We have not made  the obvious adjustment  to account  for the increased 
coverage, but doing so would have no effect on the comments that 
follow. 
Several points emerge from table 3. First, the data show that loans 
sold in each quarter  may  amount  to three  times  the stock of outstandings 
or more. In part, this result reflects various double-counting  problems 
that,  despite  the efforts  of the Federal  Reserve's staff,  have  probably  not 
been entirely eliminated.  But it is also true that many sold loans have 
short  maturities. 
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sales greatly exceeded loan purchases by banks, implying that most 
loans are sold outside the domestic commercial  banking  sector. Again, 
some skepticism  about the data is warranted.  For example, in contrast 
to the call-report  numbers,  the Senior Loan Officer  Survey reports  that 
between  a third  and  a half  of sold loans are purchased  by domestic  com- 
mercial  banks. But a significant  portion  of loan sales do go outside the 
domestic banking  system, primarily  to foreign banks and institutional 
investors. 
Third,  like the other  securitized  assets, loan sales grew  quickly  in the 
1980s.  This growth  is particularly  evident in the activity measure  of the 
first  column. 
Fourth,  and  most important  for our  purposes,  both the flow and  stock 
measures  of loan sales activity show that loan sales peaked sometime 
between late 1989  and the beginning  of the recession, then fell rather 
sharply.  (Reduced  interest in leveraged  buyouts was one major  reason 
for this decline.) Thus, treating  loan sales as part of banks' C&I loan 
portfolios would probably make the measured decline in this type of 
lending  larger  rather  than  smaller. 
Overall,  it does not appear  that the securitization  of bank assets ex- 
plains the slowdown in on-balance-sheet  bank lending. It is true that 
securitized  mortgages  outstanding  have grown  quickly, but in any case 
there is not much reason to look for a credit crunch in the market  for 
1-4-family  mortgages.  Securitized  consumer  credit  is growing  but  is still 
a relatively  small  component  of total lending,  while sold or participated 
C&I  loans-which  are  the securitized  assets bearing  the closest connec- 
tion to the "special"  lending  function  of banks-have  actually  declined 
as much as, or more than, on-balance-sheet  C&I lending over the re- 
cession. 
Finally  on the topic of securitization,  one might  ask why the trend  to- 
ward securitization  has occurred  in the first  place. There is no obvious 
fundamental  reason  why, in equilibrium,  investors  should  prefer  to hold 
securitized  assets rather  than the liabilities  of the bank  itself;21  indeed, 
considerations  of moral  hazard  suggest that it is more efficient  for the 
lender to own the loan, thereby internalizing  the costs and benefits of 
the lender's screening  and monitoring  activities. The main  impetus  for 
21. Diversification  is a reason  often cited, but similar  effects should  be attainable  by 
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securitization  is probably  the avoidance  of regulatory  costs: reserve re- 
quirements  in an earlier  period  and regulatory  capital  requirements  to- 
day. This observation  further  motivates  our discussion  below of banks' 
capital  problems. 
Overzealous Regulation 
Some bankers have blamed the lending slowdown on overzealous 
regulation, particularly  more aggressive examination practices that 
have allegedly  forced banks to make excessive charges  against  current 
capital  and  to accept new credit  risks more  cautiously. 
It seems likely that  bank  examiners  have become tougher  in response 
to the criticism that bank regulators  have been excessively lax in the 
past, particularly  in connection  with  the savings  and  loan debacle. What 
is less clear is whether  in assessing capital  charges  against  prospective 
loan losses examiners  have begun  to exceed the appropriate  standard  of 
actuarial  fairness. Surprisingly,  despite the interest in the subject, no 
studies appear  to have compared  examiners'  charges  against  capital,  in 
anticipation  of loan losses, with the actual  loan losses that were subse- 
quently  realized.  Absent such studies, it is difficult  to assess whether  the 
examiners'  procedures  involve important  biases.22  On the other hand, 
even if such studies  were available,  they would  likely suffer  from  a "peso 
problem,"  given the systematic  risks  that  affect the banking  system. For 
example, if it were found (as it would be) that bank examiners  consis- 
tently  underestimated  bank  losses in the 1980s,  would  this  prove  that  ex- 
amination  procedures  are systematically  lax? Probably  not. Such a re- 
sult would only confirm  that examiners  are no better than bankers at 
forecasting  systematic problems  like the LDC debt crisis or the sharp 
declines in real  estate values in some regions  of the United States. 
These arguments  suggest that it will be hard to determine  whether 
regulators  are "excessively" tough. However, suppose it is true that 
bank  examiners  have recently  gone from  being too lax to being actuari- 
ally fair, so that excessive toughness is not an issue. Such a change in 
standards  would be desirable  overall but would nevertheless have the 
effect of reducing  the supply  of bank  loans. Could  such a change  in regu- 
latory  behavior  be an important  part  of the story? 
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Table 4.  Loan Losses for All FDIC-insured Commercial Banks, 1981-90 
Billions  of dollars, except  ratios 
Provisionsl  Allowancesl 
Net  net  Allowances  Non-  non- 
Provisions  charge-  charge-  for loan  current  current 
Year  for losses  offs  offs  losses  loans  loans 
1981  5.1  3.8  1.35  11.4  ...  ... 
1982  8.5  6.6  1.28  13.3  36.2  0.37 
1983  10.8  8.5  1.27  15.5  40.9  0.38 
1984  13.8  10.8  1.28  18.7  43.6  0.43 
1985  17.7  13.2  1.34  23.2  43.9  0.53 
1986  22.0  16.6  1.33  28.9  48.4  0.60 
1987  37.5  16.4  2.29  49.7  63.3  0.79 
1988  17.1  18.5  0.92  46.7  56.6  0.83 
1989  31.0  22.9  1.36  53.7  62.1  0.87 
1990  31.9  29.1  1.10  55.5  78.2  0.71 
Source: Data  are  from  Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation,  Statistics  on Banking,  various  issues. Recent  data 
were obtained  directly  from  the FDIC. Noncurrent  loans refers  to loans  and leases 90 days or more  past due plus 
loans and leases in nonaccrual  status. Provisions  and net charge-offs  are annual  flows;  allowances  and noncurrent 
loans are stocks measured  as of December  call dates. 
A simple way to address this issue is to consider whether  variables 
such as banks' allowances for loan losses and charges to capital have 
jumped  discontinuously  in the recent recession. Table  4 presents some 
relevant  data  for commercial  banks insured  by the Federal  Deposit In- 
surance  Corporation  (FDIC) over the past decade. In the table, provi- 
sions for losses and net charge-offs  are flow variables  representing,  re- 
spectively, the funds  set aside  by banks  in anticipation  of loan  losses and 
the realization  of those losses (determined  in part  by regulators).  Allow- 
ances for loan losses, also known as loan-loss reserves, are the cumu- 
lated stock of provisions  less net charge-offs.23  The table  also shows the 
end-of-year  stock of noncurrent  loans. 
The table indicates  that in the 1980s  banks  generally  made loan-loss 
provisions that were about one-third  larger  than their net charge-offs, 
leading  to a steady increase in allowances  for loan losses both in abso- 
lute terms  and relative  to noncurrent  loans. The outlying  observation  is 
1987, during  which banks significantly  increased their loan-loss provi- 
sions and their stock of allowances; this buildup  of reserves, taken in 
response to the LDC debt crisis and other long-term  problems, was 
23. The  change  in allowances  does not exactly  equal  provisions  less charge-offs  in the 
table, presumably  because  of factors  such  as bank  closings  or reorganizations. C )3)  ^3333300  t 
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partly  offset by lower  provisions  in 1988.  Other  than  the 1987-88  period, 
however, there  are no evident discontinuities  in the table. In particular, 
neither  provisions nor charge-offs  in 1989-90 seem grossly out of line 
with previous trends, particularly  given the increasing  losses experi- 
enced by banks  during  that  period.  This conclusion  also holds if we look 
at specific  regions, such as New England.24 
Overall, we do not find any clear evidence for the idea that over- 
zealous regulation  has significantly  reduced  lending.  Further,  to the ex- 
tent that bank examiners  have become tougher, their primary  motiva- 
tions are surely the loan losses and the depletion of bank capital that 
have occurred  in recent years. Thus, as with securitization,  the funda- 
mental  factor seems to be the fall in bank capital. The next section of 
this paper  looks more closely at the bank capital  problem  as a potential 
source of the reduction  in loan supply. 
The Capital Crunch 
In recent testimony  before Congress,  Richard  Syron  argued  that the 
credit crunch  in New England  was due to a shortage  of bank capital- 
hence his term, capital crunch. According  to Syron, a collapse in the 
New England  real estate bubble forced banks in the region to write 
down loans, which depleted their equity capital (in the book value 
sense). In order  to meet regulatory  capital  standards,  including  the new 
international  standards  being phased in during  this period under the 
Basle Accord,25  banks had to sell assets and scale back their lending. 
Syron  went on to argue  that  this capital  crunch  contributed  to the sever- 
ity of the recession in New England. 
Regional  data bearing  on Syron's argument  are reported  in table 5. 
The table shows annual  growth  rates of nominal  bank  assets and equity 
capital  as well as the aggregate  capital-to-asset  ratio  for each census re- 
gion over the 1986-90  period. Also shown are the most recent ratios of 
nonperforming  assets to total assets and  the nominal  growth  rates of re- 
gional personal income (which can be  compared with the nominal 
growth  rates of bank  assets and capital). 
24. For example,  in New England  in 1990  net charge-offs  equaled  only 31 percent  of 
noncurrent  loans, less than  the national  ratio. 
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The numbers  in table 5 are generally  consistent with Syron's story. 
New England  is indeed  the most striking  case. After  expanding  through 
1988,  bank capital  in that region plummeted  by a quarter  during  1989- 
90. The proximate  cause of the capital  decline was losses on real estate 
and other loans. By the end of 1990,  more than 5 percent of New Eng- 
land's bank  assets were nonperforming  (compared  with less than 1 per- 
cent at the end of 1986).26  Total  assets contracted  too, but  not as much- 
New England's  aggregate  capital-asset  ratio  fell from  0.060 at the end of 
1988  to 0.050 at the end of 1990.  These data may be compared  with the 
sharp  contraction  in lending  in New England  shown in table 2. 
Two other  interesting  regions  are the Mid-Atlantic  (New York, New 
Jersey, and  Pennsylvania)  and  the West South  Central  (Arkansas,  Loui- 
siana, Oklahoma,  and Texas). The Mid-Atlantic  has also suffered  real 
estate problems,  which  are  reflected  in its high  ratio  of noncurrent  assets 
to assets (0.036, second only to New England  and well above the next 
highest region)  and its low capital-asset  ratio. Table 2 showed that this 
region  also experienced  a fall in total outstanding  bank  loans. The West 
South  Central  region  experienced  a sharp  decline  in bank  capital  follow- 
ing the oil price  declines of the mid-1980s.  However, this region's  banks 
improved  their capital  positions substantially  during 1990, despite the 
national  recession. At the close of 1990,  capital-asset  ratios  in all of the 
census regions except New  England and the Mid-Atlantic seemed 
healthy. 
Relation  of Bank Capital to Bank Lending 
Some  finer  evidence on the links  between  bank  capital  and  bank  lend- 
ing during  the recent recession can be obtained  from state-level data. 
The call reports  provide state-by-state  data on bank  loans, capital, and 
assets. A simple  cross-sectional  regression  of loan growth  on bank  capi- 
tal yielded 
(1)  (?\L/L)199091  =  - 0.182  +  2.733 (K/A)1989, 
(0.067)  (0.946)  k2  = 0. 128 
where (zXLIL)199>91  is the annualized  percentage  loan growth over the 
26. The 5 percent  figure  overstates  loss rates  in that  some nonperforming  assets even- 
tually  perform  and  understates  loss rates  in that  it excludes  assets that  are  completely  writ- 
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first  three quarters  of the current  recession, and (K/A)1989  is the ratio  of 
equity capital  to bank assets at the end of 1989.  There are 51 observa- 
tions (50 states and the District  of Columbia)  and standard  errors  are in 
parentheses.  Equation  1 can be rationalized  by a model in which banks 
adjust  lending in order to set their capital-asset  ratio to a target level 
(which  in equation  1  is absorbed  in the constant). 
Equation  1 is consistent with there being a causal link between low 
capital-asset  ratios  and  low lending  growth  in the subsequent  recession, 
as implied  by the capital  crunch  story. However, an alternative  interpre- 
tation of equation 1 is possible. Suppose that economic conditions are 
serially  correlated,  so that  a state or region  doing  poorly  today  will likely 
do poorly  tomorrow.  Then  the relationship  between the capital-asset  ra- 
tio and lending  found in equation 1 might  be spurious, since it may be 
that  previous  economic misfortunes  in a state both caused bank  capital 
to fall and  implied  slower subsequent  economic  growth  (and  thus slower 
lending). Under this interpretation,  there is not necessarily any causal 
link  between bank  capital  and  bank  lending.27 
A distinction  between the capital  crunch  story and the alternative  is 
that the capital  crunch  hypothesis implies that the most recent level of 
the capital-asset  ratio  is relevant  to future  lending,  since it is the current 
level that must meet regulatory  standards.  Under the alternative  inter- 
pretation,  it is the recent  change in the capital-asset  ratio  that should  be 
relevant  for predicting  future  conditions, since if recent  times have been 
difficult  the capital-asset  ratio will have been falling, whereas if times 
have been good the capital-asset  ratio  will have been rising.  This obser- 
vation suggests  inclusion  of the recent change  in the capital-asset  ratio, 
together with the level of the capital-asset  ratio, in the regression  ex- 
plaining  lending. 
(2)  (lLIL)199091  =  - 0.199 +  3.005  (K/A)1989  - 0.846  W(KIA)198689, 
(0.07)  (1.06)  (1.43) 
2 =  0.119, 
27. Yet another  alternative  hypothesis  consistent  with equation  I is that banks  raise 
capital  in anticipation  of future  lending, so that capital  predicts  lending  but there is no 
causal  relation.  There  are two arguments  against  this story. First, at least at the regional 
level, changes  in bank  capital  in recent years seem to have been driven  by rates of loan 
losses, the result  of past  rather  than  future  economic  activity. Second, we have  allowed  a 
two-quarter  lag between  when we measure  the capital-asset  ratio  and when we measure 
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where zX(K/A)198"9  is the change in the ratio of equity capital to bank 
assets between the end of 1986  and  the end of 1989. 
When  the change  in the capital-asset  ratio  is added  to the regression, 
we find  that  it enters  with  the wrong  sign  and  is statistically  insignificant, 
while the level of the capital-asset  ratio retains its high level of signifi- 
cance. This result  lends support  to the capital  crunch  interpretation. 
A still more stringent  test of the capital  crunch  hypothesis  can be ob- 
tained by adding  a measure  of contemporaneous  economic activity to 
the right  side of the lending  regression.  If the capital-asset  ratio  in each 
state predicts  future  lending  only because it contains  information  about 
future economic activity in the state (the alternative  interpretation  of 
equation 1), then adding  a direct measure  of activity should  absorb  the 
predictive  power of the capital-asset  ratio in the regression. We chose 
state employment growth as the most comprehensive and promptly 
available  measure  of economic activity at the state level. Adding  con- 
temporaneous  employment  growth  to equation  1 yields 
(3)  (/AL/L)199091  =  -0.161  +  2.627  (K/A)1989 +  0.755(/AE/E)199>91, 
(0.063)  (0.881)  (0.258) 
R2  =  0.245, 
where (AE/E)199>91  is the annualized  percentage  employment  growth  in 
the state between 1990:2  and 1991:1. 
Equation  3 shows that  employment  growth  is strongly  related  to cur- 
rent loan growth, as expected, but also that employment  growth does 
not weaken the relationship  between the ratio of bank capital to bank 
assets and subsequent  lending.  In other  words, given current  economic 
activity, states with lower capital-asset  ratios continue  to exhibit lower 
rates of bank  lending  than states with higher  capital-asset  ratios.28  This 
result is further evidence against the alternative hypothesis that the 
capital-asset  ratio  predicts  lending  only because it is informative  about 
future  economic  activity. 
Evidence from  New  Jersey 
In addition  to using state-level  data  to study the link between capital 
and  lending,  we also examine  data  from  individual  banks. For this paper 
28. Similar  results  have been obtained  across Federal  Reserve  districts  for C&I  lend- 
ing  by Ronald  Johnson  (1991)  of the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New York.  Johnson  showed 
that  the quality  of real  estate loans  was also a determinant  of banks'  C&I  lending. Ben S. Bernanke and Cara S. Lown  225 
we conducted a small case study of banks in the state of New Jersey. 
The principal  advantage  of looking  at banks  in a single state is that, pre- 
sumably,  banks  within  a given state (particularly  a small  state like New 
Jersey) face more or less the same general  economic conditions. Thus 
differences  in loan growth  among  banks are more likely to be attribut- 
able  to factors  specific  to the individual  banks,  such  as their  capital-asset 
ratios.29 
From the call reports we first extracted data on all banks extant in 
New Jersey between the December 1989 and March 1991 call-report 
dates. Not all of these banks existed continuously  over the whole pe- 
riod, either because they were started up during  the period, because 
they were closed temporarily  (missing  one or more  call  reports)  and  then 
reorganized,  or because they were acquired  by other  banks  (in all cases 
acquirers  were other  New Jersey  banks).  The eight  banks  in the first  two 
categories  were all quite small  (as of March  1991,  their  loans accounted 
for less than  0.5 percent  of outstanding  bank  loans in the state)  and  were 
omitted  from  the study. To deal with mergers,  we treated  acquiring  and 
acquired  banks as a single bank, adding  together  their  pre-merger  data 
as if the merger  had taken  place before the beginning  of the sample  pe- 
riod.30  After these adjustments,  a sample of 111 banks remained. Of 
these, we classified  21 as large  banks  (assets of at least $1 billion  in De- 
cember 1989)  and  90 as small  banks  (assets of less than  $1 billion). 
As with the state data, our interest is in examining  the relationship 
between banks' capital-asset ratios before the recession (December 
1989)  and the growth  in bank  lending  during  the recession (between the 
June 1990  and March 1991  call reports).  As a first step, we aggregated 
large and small banks into four categories each, based on December 
1989  capital-asset  ratios  (the ranges  were 0-6 percent,  6-8 percent,  8-10 
percent, and  greater  than 10  percent).  The subsequent  lending  behavior 
of each of these categories of banks, broken down by type of loan, is 
summarized  in table  6. 
The behavior  of small  banks, which  in aggregate  were responsible  for 
a little  more  than  one-sixth  of total  lending  in the state, is described  in the 
29. Besides smallness,  other  advantages  of using  New Jersey  specifically  (besides  the 
fact that  it is the home  state  of one of the authors)  include  its economic  diversity,  its man- 
ageable  number  of banks,  and  the fact that  it has suffered  a fairly  severe  recession. 
30. We thank  Stavros  Peristiani  of the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New York  for  data  on 
bank  mergers  in New Jersey.  The  acquisition  of a small  out-of-state  bank  by a New Jersey 
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Table 6.  The Growth of Lending in New Jersey from 1990:2 to 1991:1, 
by Size and Capitalization of Bank 
Percent, unless otherwise  noted 
Capital-asset  ratio in 1989:4 
Less than  More than 
Item  0.06  0.06-0.08  0.08-0.10  0.10 
Small banks 
Total loans  -2.8  0.6  2.9  4.3 
Commercial-industrial  loans  - 9.7  -  10.4  - 7.5  - 6.2 
Real estate loans  -0.2  4.0  4.6  7.8 
1-4-family  -6.5  3.7  4.3  7.3 
Other  11.8  6.0  7.0  11.8 
Consumer  and other loans  -8.5  -0.7  13.5  6.3 
Financial  position in 1989:4 
Capital-asset  ratio  0.053  0.069  0.087  0.144 
Loans (billions  of dollars)  3.8  4.4  1.0  0.8 
Large banks 
Total loans  - 8.8  -7.4  - 5.8  ... 
Commercial-industrial loans  -  11.9  -  14.8  -  10.2  ... 
Real estate loans  -  1.8  3.6  1.9  ... 
1-4-family  -0.6  0.4  3.3  ... 
Other  - 2.9  -7.0  0.4  ... 
Consumer  and other loans  -22.1  -4.1  -  15.7  ... 
Financial  position in 1989:4 
Capital-asset  ratio  0.054  0.066  0.086  ... 
Loans (billions  of dollars)  21.9  23.8  1.8  0.0 
Source:  Data are from the call reports and have not been seasonally  adjusted. Large banks are defined to be banks 
with at least $1 billion in assets  in December  1989. The  sample includes  21 large banks and 90 small banks.  See  the 
text for more detailed discussion. 
top half of the table. These data strongly  support  a positive association 
between capital-asset  ratios  and subsequent  lending  growth.  Well-capi- 
talized  small  banks  expanded  their  lending  more  than  poorly  capitalized 
banks (or cut back on their lending  by less) in most individual  lending 
categories as well as in overall totals. An interesting  exception is real 
estate lending,  in which  poorly  capitalized  banks  made  a sharp  shift  from 
1-4-family  mortgages  to the "other"  category  (which  includes  commer- 
cial real estate and construction  loans), despite the relatively  more fa- 
vorable treatment  of 1-4-family mortgages  under the new risk-based 
capital  standards.  This shift suggests  "gambling"  behavior  on the part  of 
the poorly  capitalized  banks. 
Large  banks  in New Jersey were generally  less well capitalized  than 
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banks.  Within  the category  of large  banks,  however, the relationship  be- 
tween capital-asset  ratios and lending  is observable  but appears  signifi- 
cantly  weaker.  Although  better  capitalized  large  banks  contracted  lend- 
ing by less overall, the differences were not large. Also, for the large 
banks, the relationship  between capital-asset  ratios and lending  within 
subcategories  of loans is not always clear. 
A bank-by-bank  regression of lending growth during  the recession 
against  December 1989  capital-asset  ratios, analogous  to equation 1 for 
the state-by-state  data, yields 
(4)  (ALIL),99 
=  -0.104  +  2.024 (K/A)1989. 
(0.076)  (0.556)  R2 =  0.100 
For small  banks  only, the same regression  gave 
(5)  (AL/L)19909,  =  -  0.187  +  2.483 (K/A)1989. 
(0.028)  (0.198)  k2  = 0.646 
These regressions  give quantitatively  similar  results  to the state-by-state 
regression.3'  The coefficient on the capital-asset  ratio is highly signifi- 
cant in both equations,  particularly  in equation  5, in which  it has a t-sta- 
tistic exceeding 12. This equation  also has a high  adjusted  R2. 
Since New Jersey is divided  between two Federal  Reserve districts 
(the New York district  in the north  and the Philadelphia  district  in the 
south), the regressions  above can also be run  for northern  and southern 
banks separately,  further  reducing  the size of the banking  market  under 
consideration.  The north-south  results  are  quite  similar  to the overall  re- 
sults in equations  4 and  5. 
In contrast  to the results for all banks and for small  banks only, the 
same  regression  run  for large  banks  only yields a coefficient  on the capi- 
tal-asset  ratio, which, although  positive, is small  and statistically  insig- 
nificant.  This finding  accords with the impression  given by table 6, that 
capital-asset ratios and lending were more strongly linked for small 
banks  than  for large  banks.  The result  for large  banks  in New Jersey  may 
be interpreted  as evidence against the capital crunch hypothesis: it 
31. Our  discussant  and other  Brookings  Panel  members  wondered  if equations  4 and 
5 might  better  be specified  nonlinearly,  since banks  near  the regulatory  minimum  capital- 
asset ratio  might  respond  differently  to changes  in capital  than banks  far from  the mini- 
mum. However, a scatter  plot of the data did not suggest  obvious departures  from lin- 
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might  be argued  that only large  banks face a statewide  lending  market, 
while small  banks  are confined  to lending  within  a very small  area;  if so, 
it may be that  the positive results  for small  banks  reflect  a spurious  cor- 
relation induced by the effect of recent economic performance  in the 
small  bank's  locality  on both capital-asset  ratios  and  the bank's  lending. 
On the other  hand, the negative  results  for large  banks  could simply  de- 
rive from the relatively small number  of large  banks in the sample  and 
the lack of sample  variation  in large  banks' capital-asset  ratios.32 
Taken together, the evidence from the states and from New Jersey 
seems to provide support  for the capital  crunch  hypothesis:  declines in 
bank capital  have contributed  to the slowdown in lending. The magni- 
tude of the effect is not insignificant  but, based on the regression  coeffi- 
cients, does not seem extremely  large  either. For example,  these regres- 
sion coefficients  suggest  that the 1988-90  fall in capital  in New England 
explains  only 2 to 3 percentage  points  of that  region's  precipitous  decline 
in lending." 
Implications  for the Economy and for Policy 
If a capital  shortage  has reduced  bank  lending  below its economically 
desirable level, this raises two potential concerns for public policy. 
First, if bank lending  is cut back, bank-dependent  borrowers, such as 
some small businesses, may find it more difficult  or costly to obtain 
credit. This additional  burden on bank-dependent  borrowers will be 
viewed by many  people as inequitable;  it may also be inefficient  for the 
economy in the long run  if, for example, it is true that small  businesses 
play an important  role in developing  product  and process innovations. 
The abundance  of anecdotal  evidence suggests that at least some small 
32. The capital-asset  ratios  for large  banks  were strongly  clustered  around  0.06. Since 
we know  that  at least a few of the large  banks  are  controlled  by multibank  holding  compa- 
nies, it seems  possible  that  the capital-asset  ratios  reported  for  these banks  represent  stra- 
tegic accounting  decisions by the parent  company  and do not necessarily  indicate the 
amount  of capital  available  to the bank. 
33. This conclusion  uses a model estimated  in a cross section to make a time series 
prediction.  Guiseppe  Bertola  has pointed  out to us, correctly,  that  it would  be preferable 
to specify  an explicit  time  series  model  of the  joint behavior  of capital,  assets, and  lending. 
Another  objection  to our conclusion  is that measurement  error  may bias the regression 
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borrowers  have suffered  from the reduction  in bank lending  during  the 
recent downturn.  More systematic  evidence is provided  by Mark  Gert- 
ler and Simon Gilchrist,  who have found using the Quarterly  Financial 
Reports  that small  manufacturing  firms  grew considerably  more slowly 
than  large  firms  after 1991:1.34  However, in a recent survey, small  busi- 
nesses reported  experiencing  no significant  credit  crunch  (except in real 
estate and  in New England).35 
Second, in principle, reduced bank lending arising from a capital 
shortage  could dampen  economic activity, affecting  both aggregate  de- 
mand  and aggregate  supply. The potential  aggregate  supply effects are 
straightforward:  by limiting  access to working  capital, reduced  lending 
could force firms  to shed workers  and delay investment  plans, reducing 
output  in both the short  and  long run. 
Effects  of Reduced  Bank Lending  on Aggregate  Demand 
The aggregate  demand  effects of a reduction  in bank lending have 
been worked out in a simple IS-LM context by Bernanke and Alan 
Blinder,36  under  the additional  assumption  (not made  in the standard  IS- 
LM model) that bank  loans are imperfect  substitutes  for other types of 
assets (bonds and money). For the purposes of this paper, their result 
may  be summarized  thus:  in an  IS-LM  diagram  with  the safe real  interest 
rate  on the vertical  axis, an  exogenous  decline  in bank  lending  (resulting, 
for example,  from  a shortage  of equity capital)  is a negative  IS shock to 
the economy.37  The intuition  behind  this conclusion  is straightforward. 
Given  the safe real  interest  rate, the net return  to investment  for a bank- 
dependent  borrower  depends not only on the marginal  product of the 
proposed  investment  but  also on the cost of financial  intermediation  (the 
difference  between the safe interest  rate and the effective cost of funds 
to the bank-dependent  borrower).  An exogenous decline in banks'  will- 
ingness to lend either cuts off bank-dependent  borrowers  entirely or 
34. Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1991). 
35. National  Federation  of Independent  Business  (1991,  p. 10). 
36. Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988).  Variants  of their  model  are presented  in Romer  and 
Romer  (1990)  and  Kashyap,  Stein, and  Wilcox  (1991). 
37. What  we refer  to as the IS curve, Bernanke  and Blinder  refer  to as the CC curve, 
for "commodities  and credit."  The CC curve combines  the conventional  goods market 
equilibrium  with  an equilibrium  condition  for  the loan  market.  Financial  factors  can  affect 
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forces them  to employ  more  costly forms  of credit.  In either  case, the net 
return  to investing,  and  thus the investment  demand  of bank-dependent 
borrowers,  falls at any given safe real interest  rate, so that  the IS curve 
shifts  down. Absent  any other  change,  the downward  IS shift  is contrac- 
tionary  for the macroeconomy. 
Two points  can be usefully  added  to this brief  analysis. First, the Ber- 
nanke-Blinder  conclusions require only that bank loans be imperfect 
substitutes  for other  assets; credit  rationing,  in the sense used by Joseph 
Stiglitz  and  Andrew  Weiss, is consistent  with  their  story  but  is not essen- 
tial.38  Thus the notion that a  macroeconomically significant credit 
crunch  necessarily involves elements of credit rationing  or a complete 
cutoff of some groups  from  credit  is incorrect. 
Second, the IS-curve effect  suggested by  the Bernanke-Blinder 
model occurs whenever the wedge between the safe real interest rate 
and  the effective cost of credit  to borrowers  increases;  it does not matter 
whether  the increased  cost of intermediation  is due to problems  in the 
banking  sector or (alternatively)  to weaknesses in borrowers'  balance 
sheets that make it more difficult  for them to obtain credit. Hence, al- 
though  it is possible that  the recent  decline  in lending  has  more  to do with 
the financial  problems  of borrowers  than  those of banks,  there  is nothing 
benign  about such a situation,  and the macroeconomic  implications  are 
the same as those of a fall in lending  caused by weaknesses in the bank- 
ing system. 
We have identified  two areas  of potential  concern  about  the effects of 
a reduction  in bank  lending  resulting  from  a shortage  of capital:  namely, 
the direct  effects on bank-dependent  borrowers  and  the indirect  effects 
on the macroeconomy.  Qualitatively,  these effects will occur as long as 
bank  loans are imperfect  substitutes  for other  types of credit  provision, 
which we certainly  believe to be true  for at least some types of lending. 
Quantitatively,  however, the effect of a reduction  in bank lending de- 
pends on several factors, including  (1) the size of the reduction  in the 
supply  of bank  loans;  (2)  the extent to which  a given reduction  in lending 
raises the cost of credit  to borrowers,  which in turn  depends  on the de- 
gree to which other  forms  of credit  can be substituted  for  bank  loans; (3) 
the share of output, employment, and investment accounted for by 
bank-dependent  borrowers;  and (4) the strength  of the economy's re- 
sponse to a given change  in aggregate  demand. 
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It is well beyond  what  we can  accomplish  here  to obtain  accurate  esti- 
mates of each of these factors. Instead we attempt  to contribute  two 
small  pieces to the puzzle. First, we look briefly  at the degree  to which 
alternative  forms of credit  have been substituted  for bank  loans during 
the recession. We then make a direct attempt  to measure  the employ- 
ment  effect of the credit  crunch  using state data. 
Substitutes for Bank Lending 
If alternative  forms  of credit  are easily substitutable  with  bank  loans, 
so that reduced bank lending has relatively little effect on the cost of 
credit faced by borrowers,  then a fall in the supply of bank loans will 
have only a small  economic effect. If alternative  forms  of credit  are not 
easily substitutable  with  bank  loans, by contrast,  the economic  effect of 
a fall in bank lending-both  directly  on small  borrowers  and indirectly 
on the macroeconomy  as a whole-may  be significant. 
To what degree  have other  forms  of credit  substituted  for bank  loans 
in the most recent recession, and how does the experience of the 1990 
recession compare with that of previous ones? Data bearing  on these 
questions  are given in tables 7 and 8. Table 7 examines the behavior  of 
commercial-industrial  loans by  domestically chartered commercial 
banks and five alternative  sources of short- to medium-term  business 
credit  over the same six recessions shown  in table 1. For each recession 
and each form  of credit, the table shows both the value of outstandings 
(in billions  of dollars)  in the quarter  before the cyclical peak and  the an- 
nualized  growth  rate of that  form  of credit  over the next three quarters. 
Table  8 presents  similar  data  for mortgage  lending  for commercial  prop- 
erties, another  intermediation-intensive  form  of credit.  All data  are  from 
the Flow of Funds  accounts. 
One of the most interesting  results in tables 7 and 8 relates to the re- 
cent behavior  of nonfinancial  commercial  paper.  In previous  recessions, 
slowdowns in bank lending  have been accompanied  by spurts  in com- 
mercial-paper  issuance, a point that Anil Kashyap, Jeremy Stein, and 
David Wilcox have noted, and which they interpret  as evidence for the 
view that  most  previous  recessions  have resulted  from  monetary  policy- 
induced slowdowns in bank lending.39  However, in the 1990  recession 
commercial  paper  outstanding  actually  declined.  This  decline  is surpris- 
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ing if one believes that a credit  crunch  was an important  force in the re- 
cession, since the expectation is that, in a credit crunch, firms  that are 
able to substitute  commercial  paper issuance for bank loans would do 
so. 
More  generally,  the impression  from  tables 7 and 8 is that a large  up- 
surge  in alternatives  to bank  credit  did not occur during  the 1990  reces- 
sion; if anything,  there has been less switching  to alternative  forms of 
credit  in the current  recession. Indeed, in the recent recession, the per- 
centage  growth  of total short-  to medium-term  business credit  has been 
about the same as bank C&I lending (table 7), and the growth of total 
commercial  mortgages  outstanding  has been lower than the growth in 
commercial  mortgages  held  by banks  (table  8).40  More  broadly,  the Flow 
of Funds'  measure  of private  domestic  nonfinancial  credit  grew  at an an- 
nualized  rate of 3.3 percent  between 1990:2  and 1991:  1, compared  with 
1.7 percent  for total bank  loans (see table 1). 
What  do we make  of the result  that  during  the 1990  recession alterna- 
tives to bank  lending  did not grow any more quickly  than  bank  lending 
itself? The most likely explanation  is that the recession brought  with it 
an overall  decline  in credit  demand  (perhaps  exacerbated  by borrowers' 
weak  balance  sheets)  that  affected  alternatives  to bank  lending  as well as 
bank  loans and that overwhelmed  changes in the supply  of bank  loans. 
Additional  evidence for the view that  demand  factors  were dominant 
during  the recession comes from comparing  the recent recession with 
the previous  year (1989:2-1990:2).  The behavior  of alternatives  to bank 
lending  in the earlier  period  gives a much  stronger  impression  of a credit 
crunch  in the banking  sector. In the category  of short-  to medium-term 
business credit, domestic bank C&I loans grew only 2.8 percent in the 
prerecession  period, while foreign  bank  C&I  loans grew 9.7 percent, fi- 
nance  company  business credit  grew  9.7 percent,  and  commercial  paper 
outstanding  grew 16.7  percent.41  Similarly,  while bank  holdings  of mort- 
gages  for commercial  properties  grew  only 2.8 percent  in the year  before 
the recession, life insurance  companies  increased  their  holdings  by 12.9 
percent.42  These data  are consistent  with the idea that  a credit  crunch  in 
40. Perhaps  the most striking  feature  of the 1990  column  in table  8 is the large  transfer 
of commercial  mortgages  from savings institutions  to the "other"  category. This shift 
largely  reflects  the ongoing  resolution  of thrift  failures. 
41. Compare  with  table  7. Trade  credit  grew  3.9 percent  in the earlier  period  and  C&I 
loans  by savings  institutions  fell 15.0  percent. 
42. Compare  with  table  8. Mortgages  held  by savings  institutions  fell 14.2  percent  and 
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banking  was in progress  in the prerecession  period  and even during  the 
recession period,  but they are inconsistent  with the view that  a reduced 
supply  of bank  loans was a dominant  factor  in the recession.43 
Capital-Asset  Ratios  and Employment  Growth 
Earlier  in this paper  we showed a statistically  significant  link across 
states  between  bank  capital-asset  ratios  and  subsequent  lending  growth. 
A potentially interesting  exercise is to extend this analysis to see if 
changes  in state lending  growth  induced  by variation  in capital-asset  ra- 
tios have significant  predictive  power  for economic activity in the state. 
For this exercise, we used as the dependent  variable  each state's actual 
employment  growth  between 1990:2  and 1991:  1, IAE/EI9909l,  less the em- 
ployment  change that would have been predicted  during  the recession 
on the basis of the state's industrial  composition, kI\E1,990 44 The idea 
was to see how much of the unexplained  or idiosyncratic  variation  in 
each state's employment  can be explained  by banking  factors. The re- 
sults described below apply equally to actual employment change, 
however. 
We first  verified  that  the growth  in actual  less predicted  employment 
in each state is related to contemporaneous  growth in bank lending in 
the state. A cross-sectional  ordinary  least squares  regression  of residual 
employment  growth  on growth  in lending  gives45 
(6)  [(AE/E)1990_91  -  (A/E)199091] =  -0.0016  + 0.207 (ALIL)1990  91, 
(0.0049)  (0.061) 
R  =  0.174, 
where  [(IXE/E)1990_91  -  (At/EE)1990_91]  is actual  less predicted  employment 
growth  in the state between 1990:2  and 1991:  1, annualized. 
43. An alternative  view is that  the credit  crunch  spread  from  the banking  sector  in 1989 
to all other suppliers  of credit in 1990.  Some alternative  lenders, such as life insurance 
companies,  have  indeed  run  into problems  recently,  but  it seems excessively coincidental 
that  all sources  of credit  would  dry  up at about  the same  time. 
44. To construct  the predicted  employment  change,  we calculated  what  the state's  em- 
ployment  growth  would have been if its employment  in each one-digit  SIC industry  had 
grown  by the same  percentage  as national  employment  in that  industry  between  June  1990 
and  March  1991. 
45. Because  a constant  term  is included  in the cross-sectional  regression,  identical  re- 
sults would be obtained  if lending  growth  were measured  in real terms  or relative  to the 
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Not surprisingly,  there  is a statistically  significant  relationship  across 
states between changes  in employment  and  bank  lending.  This relation- 
ship reflects the link between economic growth and credit demand  as 
well as the link  between  growth  and  credit  supply.  Earlier,  we found  evi- 
dence consistent with the view that shocks to bank capital-asset  ratios 
were a source  of shocks to loan supply  in the recent  recession. To isolate 
the effects of changes in loan supply on economic activity, we rerun 
equation  6 using the bank capital-asset  ratio in each state at the end of 
1989  as an instrument  for bank  loan growth.  The instrumental  variables 
result  is46 
(7)  [(AEIE)199,,91  -  (AIlE)199,91]  =  -  0.0002  +  0.062 (ALIL)199,,91, 
(0.0036)  (0.169) 
R  =  0.078. 
The econometric exogeneity of the capital-asset  ratio in equation 7 
can be debated, though  there is little need to-the  IV regression  shows 
no significant  relationship  between lending  and the unpredicted  part  of 
employment growth. It might be that this regression is too crude to 
measure  the economic effects of the credit crunch (in principle,  many 
other  factors  could  be controlled  for), but taken  at face value this simple 
exercise suggests that the credit crunch  has not been a major  cause of 
the recession.47 
What  is our overall assessment of the macroeconomic  effect of the 
credit  crunch  in the banking  sector?  We cannot  be certain,  but  the pieces 
of evidence that we have turned  up are not consistent with a large role 
for the credit crunch. First, as the results  just reported  show, although 
ratios  of bank  capital  to bank  assets did have an effect on lending,  bank 
capital  and  the severity  of recession across states are only weakly corre- 
lated. Second, although  the relationship  between bank  capital  and lend- 
ing is highly  significant,  it is modest in size. Third,  the behavior  of over- 
46. An outlier  check  found  a large  influence  from  Alaska,  which  had  a sharp  decline  in 
employment  despite a high ratio  of bank  capital  to assets. Exclusion  of Alaska  yields a 
coefficient  on loan  growth  of 0.179, with  a t-statistic  of 1.27. 
47. In  theory,  a reason  that  we might  find  no link  by state  between  lending  and  employ- 
ment  is that borrowers  are free to borrow  from  banks  outside  the state. However, Ellie- 
hausen  and  Wolken  (1990)  found  that  of small  and  medium-sized  businesses  with  a credit 
relationship  91.5 percent  had a local relationship  (within  30 miles) and 75.8 percent  had 
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all credit aggregates suggests that credit demand factors have con- 
tributed  in an important  way to the slowdown in bank  lending. Finally, 
we note that there are important  sectors of the economy, such as the 
housing  and  auto sectors, in which  weakness  probably  cannot  be blamed 
on the credit  crunch. 
Whether  the credit  crunch  was important  in the recession is to some 
extent academic, however. As the next section discusses, whether  the 
recession resulted  from a credit crunch  or other causes does not bear 
strongly  on the ability  of monetary  and  other  stabilization  policies to off- 
set the downturn. 
Implications for  Monetary Policy 
Federal  Reserve  officials  have shown  a great  deal of concern  over the 
past year about the possibility of a credit crunch, perhaps  because of 
their  dual  role as monetary  authorities  and  banking  regulators.  Our  evi- 
dence, admittedly sparse, is that the credit crunch-although  not a 
myth-has  not been a major  cause of the recession. Nevertheless, a few 
points about the implications  for monetary  policy of credit crunches- 
present  or future-should be made. 
First, some have worried  that an unwillingness  by banks  to lend can 
render  monetary  policy impotent. This concern is misplaced  unless a 
traditional  liquidity  trap (a perfectly elastic demand  for money at the 
prevailing  interest rate) also exists. Even if banks will not lend, an in- 
crease in reserves will raise the supply of deposits, lower open market 
interest  rates (through  the usual  liquidity  effect), and stimulate  interest- 
sensitive spending.  However, it is true that if banks  refuse to lend (that 
is, if banks  accommodate  deposit  expansion  only by holding  more  secu- 
rities),  the "credit  channel"  of monetary  influence  will  be shut  down, and 
the real effects of a given monetary  expansion  will be smaller.  In terms 
of the Bernanke-Blinder  model, under normal  conditions a monetary 
expansion  raises aggregate  demand  both by shifting  the LM curve and 
by shifting  the IS curve (by stimulating  bank  lending);  if banks  refuse to 
lend, only the traditional  LM-curve  mechanism  is operative. 
Second, although  a credit  crunch  will not render  monetary  policy im- 
potent, it may make it more difficult  to use conventional  indicators  to 
judge how tight or easy current  policy is. In general, during  a credit 
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lower than normal  for a given state of the economy, thereby sending 
conflicting  signals. Monetary  aggregates  may be lower than normal  (as 
in the recent slowdown of M2) because financial  intermediaries  will be 
making  less use of managed  liabilities, which are components of the 
monetary  aggregates,  to raise funds. Interest rates may be lower than 
normal  because, as discussed earlier, a credit crunch is a negative IS 
shock. Because problems  in the financial-intermediation  sector reduce 
the effective demand  for saving, interest rates fall. It is arguable  that 
both of these problems  with monetary  indicators  have been observed 
during  the recent  recession. 
Implications for Banking Reform 
As we write, extensive banking  reforms are being debated in Con- 
gress. What  does the recent  crunch  mean  for these reforms? 
One  of the striking  features  of recent  banking  problems  is their  strong 
regional  dimension.  The clear implication  for the banking  reform  proc- 
ess is that it is important  to remove the remaining  barriers  to interstate 
and interregional  banking and to encourage banks to diversify their 
assets nationally  (or internationally). 
Reformers  may also want to consider  whether  the bank  examination 
process can be improved.  For example, examiners'  implicit  predictions 
of bank  losses should  be subject  to evaluation  after  the fact, with incen- 
tives provided  for accuracy.  Market  data-on  the prices  received  in loan 
sales, for example-might also help examiners  evaluate  bank  capital  po- 
sitions. 
The most difficult  question  raised  by recent experience  in banking  is 
whether  extraordinary  measures  (such as allowing  nonfinancial  firms  to 
acquire  banks)  are needed in order  to recapitalize  the weakest portions 
of the banking  system. There  are  really  two issues here. First,  is the mar- 
ket for bank  equity sufficiently  imperfect  that  intervention  is desirable? 
The evidence we have presented  for a capital  crunch  is also evidence for 
important  imperfections  in the market  for bank  equity, since the idea of 
a capital  crunch  makes sense only if for some reason banks with good 
lending  opportunities  are unable  to attract  capital  in a reasonable  time 
and  on reasonable  terms. Thus  it is too facile to assert that  "the  market" 
will necessarily  take  care of banks'  capital  problems.  On  the other  hand, 
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Governors  of the Federal  Reserve, new equity issues by banks totaled 
$3.2 billion  in 1989,  $2.0 billion  in 1990,  and $4.1 billion  through  the first 
nine months  of 1991  ;48 and  there  are many  (mostly  small)  bank  startups. 
Whether  bank  capital  markets  are "sufficiently"  imperfect  to warrant  in- 
tervention  is an extremely tough call; we do not pretend  to know the 
answer. 
The second issue bearing  on the recapitalization  debate  is the optimal 
size of the banking  system. It is certainly  conceivable that the "capital 
shortage"  in banking  is a signal  from  the market  that the U.S. commer- 
cial banking  system has excess capacity.49  If so, then the question of 
how to achieve recapitalization  is moot. However, today's banking  sys- 
tem operates  with so many  restrictions  and subsidies  that  judging  its op- 
timal  size is impossible.  Reforms  that  further  rationalize  the banking  in- 
dustry  will be invaluable  in clarifying  whether  the U.S. banking  system 
needs to grow or shrink  in the future. 
48. Two billion  dollars  of bank  equity  issues in 1990  is not a huge  number  nor  is it insig- 
nificant,  being  equal  to about  one-sixth  the value of nonfinancial  corporate  equity  issues 
in 1990  ($12.3  billion,  according  to the Federal  Reserve)  and  to about  1  percent  of the total 
book value  of bank  capital  outstanding. 
49. Boyd and Graham  (1991)  argue  that  despite the recent trend  to consolidation  the 
banking  system  does not necessarily  have excess capacity. Comments 
and Discussion 
Benjamin M.  Friedman: Traditionally, most economists have re- 
garded  the fact that  banks  hold  capital  as at best a macroeconomic  irrele- 
vance and  at worst  a pedagogical  inconvenience.  The  presence  of a capi- 
tal account, rendering  bank assets not equal to bank liabilities, adds 
unwelcome complexity to the otherwise analytically  neat story of de- 
posit and credit  creation  in a fractional  reserve system. In more simple- 
minded  representations,  bank capital is one reason why the so-called 
"money  multiplier"  is not really a fixed multiplier.  The consequent in- 
centives to ignore the whole messy business have prevailed  far more 
often than  not. 
By contrast, when a banking  system involves minimum  capital re- 
quirements,  along with the more familiar  minimum  reserve require- 
ments, it is at least possible that  the effective limitation  on the expansion 
of deposits  and  credit  may  be capital,  not reserves. In this case, it is nec- 
essary to write  the familiar  balance-sheet  relationships  subject  to two in- 
equality  constraints.  Only  by accident  would  both always be binding,  or 
not, exactly in concert. And  only by presumption  would  the reserve  con- 
straint  always be binding  and  the capital  constraint  not. Further,  if what 
binds is the capital constraint,  then issues of distribution  become im- 
portant  in ways that have no ready analog under  the more familiar  re- 
serves story. There  is no equivalent  of a federal  funds market  to enable 
banks with excess capital to make transfers  to banks with insufficient 
capital, so that  the systemwide  total is all that  matters. 
Much  of the discussion  of the recent  business  downturn  in the United 
States has focused on the likelihood  that during  this period  the binding 
constraint  on banks' ability  to lend and thereby  to create money has in 
fact been the capital constraint,  and this idea is the focus of Ben Ber- 
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nanke and Cara Lown's useful and interesting  paper. Bernanke and 
Lown do a fine  job of explaining  the basic principles  involved and  relat- 
ing fluctuations  in banks' capital to the experience of losses on their 
portfolios of what bankers and their regulators euphemistically  call 
nonperforming"  loans. 
All this is interesting  enough at a conceptual  level, but the pressing 
question is whether  insufficient  capital has in fact limited U.S. banks' 
lending  to an extent that  has mattered  in a macroeconomic  context. The 
chief contribution  of the Bernanke-Lown  paper  is to show evidence, ad- 
mittedly  mixed  but  nonetheless  suggestive,  that  capital  constraints  have 
indeed  led to unwillingness  to lend, and  that  the resulting  sluggish  credit 
expansion has either corresponded  to or anticipated  the weakness of 
real economic activity. The authors'  state-by-state  regressions  relating 
loan expansion  during  the recession to either  levels or changes in bank 
capital  in the immediately  prior  period  are especially instructive  in this 
regard.  I also found quite interesting  their analysis based on individual 
bank  data. 
Indeed,  given this empirical  showing,  what  is perhaps  most surprising 
about Bernanke  and Lown's paper  is how little they claim for their re- 
sults. For example, after finding  that a simple one-variable  regression 
of loan growth  on lagged  capital  ratios  can explain  almost half of the 15 
percentage  point  difference  in loan expansion  between the fastest grow- 
ing  region  (East South  Central)  and  the slowest (New England),  they de- 
scribe this effect as "of small  to medium  size." Given the obvious mea- 
surement problems in this context,  and the consequent presumed 
downward  bias of estimated  regression  coefficients,  just how much of 
this phenomenon  would they have demanded  that their simple regres- 
sion explain  before considering  the estimated  effect to be of major  pro- 
portion?  Much  of the rest of the paper,  including  Bernanke  and Lown's 
summary  evaluation  of their  results at the beginning  and the end of the 
paper, has a similar  flavor. By contrast, against  the background  of the 
long history of researchers  who have tried to find evidence of such ef- 
fects on either  bank  behavior  or economic  activity, and  have failed  to do 
so, what  impressed  me about  the empirical  work  presented  in this paper 
is not how little evidence of such effects Bernanke  and Lown find but 
how much. 
Beyond this difference in interpretation  of the quantitative  impor- 
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and Lown's paper  also bear comment. To begin at the beginning,  what 
is a "credit  crunch"?  Bernanke  and Lown define a credit crunch  as "a 
significant  leftward  shift  in the supply  curve  for  bank  loans, holding  con- 
stant  both the safe real interest  rate  and the quality  of potential  borrow- 
ers." But is that really all there is to it? Does a "credit  crunch"  involve 
no element  at all of "credit  rationing"?  Bernanke  and  Lown clearly  state 
in their  paper  that  while their story is in no way inconsistent  with credit 
rationing  (in the standard  sense of Stiglitz  and Weiss), such phenomena 
are not a necessary  ingredient  of what they mean  by a credit  crunch. 
I doubt, however, that  a simple  leftward  shift of loan supply  in a per- 
fectly clearing market environment-so  that all would-be borrowers 
could still obtain  credit,  albeit  at a higher  market-clearing  interest  rate- 
would  qualify  as a credit  crunch  in the mind  of the typical  market  partici- 
pant or monetary  policymaker.  Surely it is no coincidence that the no- 
tion of a credit  crunch  has typically  surfaced  at times when some factor 
outside the usual story of tight monetary  policy in a fractional  reserve 
banking  system-binding  Regulation  Q ceilings and consequent disin- 
termediation  in 1966,  1970,  and 1974,  or capital  constraints  in 1990-has 
posed an impediment  to the ordinary  functioning  of the nation's credit 
mechanism.  It is also no coincidence  that  the widespread  anecdotal  evi- 
dence to which Bernanke  and Lown refer includes many examples of 
borrowers  who have been asked to wind up their loans despite having 
kept their  accounts  fully current,  or new projects  that  U.S. lenders  have 
simply  declined  to finance  at any interest  rate. In terms  of the Bernanke- 
Blinder model to which Bernanke  and Lown refer, not only is the IS 
channel  of influence  not active, as under  what they call a credit  crunch, 
but if credit  rationing  is also involved, then part  of the LM-curve  effect 
is not operative  either. 
A second and more important  point on which I differ  with Bernanke 
and  Lown concerns  the implications  of a credit  crunch  for monetary  pol- 
icy. They claim  that  whether  the recession resulted  from  a credit  crunch 
or other causes does not strongly  influence  the ability  of monetary  and 
other stabilization  policies to offset the downturn.  Unless they mean  by 
"monetary  policy" something  other than the standard  combination  of 
open market  operations  and manipulation  of reserve requirements  and 
the discount rate, how can that be so? If banks really cannot create 
money and credit because the capital restraint  is binding,  what effects 
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eral  interpretation  of Bernanke  and Lown's definition  of a credit  crunch 
as merely a leftward  shift of the loan supply curve implies that saying 
there has been a credit  crunch  leaves open the question  of whether  that 
shift has resulted  from  a binding  capital  constraint  or a binding  reserve 
constraint,  but under  this interpretation  it would then be difficult  to un- 
derstand  the focus of their paper's empirical  work on changes in bank 
capital  ratios  rather  than  on Federal  Reserve open market  operations. 
A third  issue that bears attention  is the role played in the latest eco- 
nomic downturn  by nonbank  lenders. Bernanke and Lown correctly 
point out that imperfect  substitutability  of bank and nonbank  credit is 
central  to most interpretations  of what a credit crunch  is all about (in- 
deed, for that matter,  to most credit-oriented  theories  of how monetary 
policy affects the nonfinancial  economy). As they rightly argue, one 
would then expect that, all other  things  equal, a limitation  on the ability 
or willingness  of banks  to lend should  be accompanied  by an increase  in 
credit  extensions by other  lenders.  They therefore  interpret  the absence 
of a growth  spurt  in nonbank  credit  as evidence that  much  of the decline 
in bank loans in this episode has reflected  a decline in credit demand, 
rather  than  a change  in credit  supply  from  banks. 
The problem  with this argument  stems, once again,  from  the distinc- 
tion between a credit crunch  as most observers conventionally  under- 
stand  it and  a mere  leftward  shift  of bank  loan supply  resulting  from, for 
example, tight  monetary  policy. When  the Federal  Reserve restricts  the 
supply of bank reserves, that action causes banks' loan supply to shift 
leftward  but does not affect credit supply  from other lenders, and so if 
credit demand  is unchanged  then,  just as Bernanke  and Lown suggest, 
bank lending  will contract  (or grow less slowly) while lending  by other 
institutions and from the open market will expand. By contrast, the 
credit crunch  of 1990  resulted  from the impact  on bank balance sheets 
of the credit excesses of the 1980s,  and  just as banks were not alone in 
participating  in those excesses, they are not alone  in suffering  the conse- 
quences. The same problems that have impaired  some banks' capital 
have also shrunk  the "surpluses"  of insurance  companies, have caused 
profitability  problems  for finance companies, and have led to the col- 
lapse of the  junk-bond  market.  In short, all other things have not been 
equal, and  Bernanke  and  Lown's inference  that  credit  demand  has been 
weak does not follow from  the pervasiveness  of the slowdown  in credit 
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Finally, especially in light of what I took to be the quite impressive 
evidence that Bernanke  and Lown found in favor of a credit crunch, in 
the sense of limitations  on bank lending  resulting  from insufficiency  of 
bank capital, I was sorry that they did not investigate  in greater  depth 
the possibility  of what  they call "overzealous  regulation."  Anecdotal  in- 
formation  about  individual  banks'  examinations  during  this period  is re- 
plete with stories of reclassification  of outstanding  loans on the basis of 
no change in the current  status of the specific transactions  in question. 
Similarly,  bankers  have widely reported  a new attitude on the exam- 
iners' part toward the classification,  of potential new credits. None of 
this is to say, of course, that the responsible  regulators  have done any 
more than bring  the bookkeeping  of the 1990s  into line with the reality 
left by the poor credit  decisions of the 1980s.  But in either  case it would 
be nice to know. 
General Discussion 
Members  of the panel presented  a variety of views on the effective- 
ness of monetary  policy during  the current  recession. William  Nordhaus 
agreed  with the authors  that the Federal  Reserve could offset the effect 
of capital  constraints  if it recognized  the importance  of that shock. Jo- 
seph Stiglitz observed that to the extent that monetary  policy had not 
brought  down  loan rates, even though  it had  lowered  Treasury  bill  rates, 
it had not been expansionary. This disparity could reflect a lack of 
awareness  by the Federal  Reserve that  a given Treasury  bill rate  corres- 
ponds to a tighter  policy when capital requirements  are binding, or it 
could reflect an inability  to lower loan rates by increasing  unborrowed 
reserves. Nordhaus  and William  Brainard  preferred  to regard  the bind- 
ing capital  requirements  on banks  as a shift  in the LM curve rather  than 
the IS curve since, in the first instance, such a shift corresponds  to a 
change in the demands  for and supplies of financial  assets. Because a 
shift  in the capital  constraint  affects the relationship  between open mar- 
ket interest  rates and the terms on which firms  can finance  investment, 
the interest  rate  in the traditional  LM curve should  be interpreted  as the 
cost of capital  or Tobin's  q. Brainard  noted that  in this model, tightened 
capital requirements  not only shift the LM curve up and to the left (a 
higher  required  rate on capital  for a given level of output)  but also make Ben S. Bernanke and Cara S. Lown  245 
the curve steeper. Expansionary  policy is needed  just to offset the con- 
tractionary  effect of tightened capital requirements;  still more expan- 
sionary  policy is needed to stimulate  the desired  economic  recovery. 
Richard  Cooper remarked  that one important  channel of monetary 
policy does not require  an expansion  of bank  lending:  a decrease in the 
Treasury  bill  rate  stimulates  economic  activity  by causing  a depreciation 
of the dollar.  Martin  Baily questioned  the importance  of tightened  capi- 
tal requirements  and  a credit  crunch  during  a recession. In his view, the 
credit  crunch  could  have been important  in the period  preceding  the cur- 
rent recession, having  helped the economy to turn  down; the recession 
itself, however, is better characterized  by a decline in the demand  for 
loans that keeps the capital  constraint  from binding.  The credit crunch 
should manifest  itself again during  the recovery. Ben Bernanke  noted 
that all other forms of credit were dropping  about the same amount  as 
bank loans during  the recession, consistent with Baily's view. A year 
before the cyclical peak, alternatives to bank credit were growing 
quickly  while bank  credit  was stagnating. 
Several  panelists  raised  questions  about  the empirical  analysis  in the 
paper. Cooper wondered how important  the substantial  tightening  of 
bank  supervision  has been. Some of the apparent  decline  in bank  capital 
ratios  is simply  a recognition  of nonperforming  assets. The current  con- 
sequences of this component  of the decline are presumably  less severe 
than  the earlier  deterioration  of economic  value  that  is now belatedly  be- 
ing recognized.  Joseph Stiglitz  observed that much  of the paper  tries to 
distinguish  between a supply and a demand  shift, without trying to fit 
separate  demand  and supply  functions.  Christopher  Sims noted  that  the 
paper is mostly written as if a capital shortage  originated  outside the 
banking  system and generated  effects in it. But he doubted  that banks 
have no control over the capital-asset  ratio. Adding the growth of the 
capital-asset  ratio to the regression  does not necessarily get rid of the 
endogeneity  problem;  both  low capital-asset  ratios  and  slow loan  growth 
might be caused by poor economic performance.  In the same spirit 
Brainard  suggested that the instrumental  variables method was not a 
completely satisfactory  way of dealing with endogeneity in the cross 
section. Much  of the variation  among  states or banks  is likely to be rela- 
tively permanent,  so that using lagged variables  will not eliminate  the 
endogeneity  problem.  Sims also suggested  that the authors  should  look 
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If depositors care about the capital-asset  ratios of banks, then banks 
with low capital-asset  ratios  might  have lower deposit inflows, which in 
turn  means  less lending. 
Brainard  observed that one might expect the effects of capital re- 
quirements  to be highly  nonlinear,  with changes  in capital  relatively  un- 
important  for sound banks but very important  for banks near insol- 
vency. Allen Frankel  thought  this might  explain  why the coefficient  on 
the capital-asset  ratio in the linear equation  does not do a good job of 
explaining  the New England  experience. The typical bank in New En- 
gland  is much  closer than  the average  bank  to a regulatory  problem. Ben S. Bernanke and Cara S. Lown  247 
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